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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 In this tragic case, after Appellee Jamila Russell 
enlisted the help of the Virgin Islands Superior Court and its 
Court Marshals with her truant teenage son, L.T., Deputy 
Marshal Chris Richardson allegedly shot him at his home, 
unarmed and mostly undressed, rendering him a quadriplegic.  
Russell filed suit and the District Court denied the motions of 
Richardson and the Superior Court to dismiss on various 
immunity grounds.  In this interlocutory appeal, we consider, 
among other things, whether judicial immunity extends to 
protect an officer from a suit challenging the manner in which 
he executed a court order.  Because we, like the District 
Court, conclude it does not, and the District Court’s thorough 
and careful opinion properly disposed of the motions in 
almost all respects, we will affirm except as to Appellees’ 
claim for gross negligence, for which the Virgin Islands has 
not waived sovereign immunity and which thus should be 
dismissed on remand.  
 
 
 4 
I. Background 
 
A. Factual Background1 
 
At the time of the conduct at issue in this case, L.T. 
was 15 years old and had been designated by the Virgin 
Islands Superior Court a “Person in Need of Supervision” 
(PINS), meaning a “child” who, among other things, 
“habitually disobeys the reasonable demands of the person 
responsible for the child’s care and is beyond their control.”  
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, § 2502(23).  That designation also 
subjected L.T. to a court order directing him to “follow the 
reasonable rules of his mother while living with her.”  JA 18.  
Apparently, however, his mother continued to have problems 
with his behavior. 
 
One day, concluding she needed “assistance” with 
ensuring L.T.’s compliance, Russell contacted the Superior 
Court and “requested that [L.T.] be brought before the judge 
to answer for his behavior.”  JA 18.  According to the 
complaint, she also “advised that her son was at home in his 
bed.”  JA 18.  In response to her request, several Superior 
Court Marshals, including Deputy Marshal Christopher 
Richardson, arrived at Russell’s home later that day.  L.T. 
was at that point “relaxing in his room, in his underwear and 
                                              
1 As this is an appeal of the denial of motions to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the factual allegations are taken from the 
operative complaint and accepted as true.  Krieger v. Bank of 
Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2018); Batchelor v. 
Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 
2014).  
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unarmed.”  JA 19.  The precise sequence of events that 
unfolded is unclear at this stage, but, according to the 
complaint, “Richardson shot [L.T.] under circumstances that 
were unjustified and an excessive use of force since [L.T.] 
was unarmed and did not threaten bodily harm to the 
marshals or third parties as he was attempting to run past the 
marshals.”2  JA 19. 
 
L.T. was airlifted to Puerto Rico for medical treatment, 
but the shooting rendered him a quadriplegic.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
Russell eventually filed this action on behalf of herself 
and L.T. (collectively, “the Family”)3 in the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands.  The operative complaint included claims 
against Richardson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive 
                                              
2 In their brief, Appellants take it upon themselves to 
offer additional clarity by pointing to extra detail found not in 
the complaint but rather in the Marshals’ own affidavits and 
an internal incident report that the Marshal’s Office filed with 
the Superior Court after the shooting.  At this stage, however, 
we, like the District Court, “must consider only the 
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of 
public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if 
the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”  
Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).  
3 L.T. reached the age of majority after the complaint 
was filed, and, as the caption here reflects, he is now a party 
to this case in his own right.   
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force and under territorial law for negligence, gross 
negligence, and negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, as well as claims against the Superior 
Court for negligence, negligent hiring and retention, and 
vicarious liability.4  As relevant to the claims at issue in this 
appeal, Richardson and the Superior Court (together, 
“Appellants”) filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), with Richardson arguing he 
enjoyed a form of absolute immunity known as “quasi-
judicial” immunity and qualified immunity with respect to the 
§ 1983 claim, and both parties arguing they enjoyed 
sovereign immunity with respect to the tort claims.  
 
The District Court rejected those arguments.  As to 
Richardson’s claim of quasi-judicial immunity, the District 
Court acknowledged that many cases have granted such 
immunity to officers who have been sued for their role in 
enforcing court orders but determined that the reasoning 
behind those cases “d[id]n’t cover shooting somebody.”  
JA 69.  The Court therefore held that absolute immunity did 
not apply.  And while the Court recognized that the qualified 
immunity issue should be decided “at the earliest point 
possible in the case,” JA 12; see Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 
224, 227 (1991) (per curiam) (noting “the importance of 
resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in 
litigation”), it found this case “too fact sensitive for [it] to 
                                              
4 While the complaint also named as a defendant the 
Government of the Virgin Islands, none of the claims was 
expressly directed at the Government and it is not a party to 
this appeal.  It has, however, filed a brief in support of 
Appellants. 
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make that kind of ruling now, without discovery,” JA 85.  
Instead, it explained, Richardson would be permitted to renew 
the defense once a “fuller factual record ha[d] been 
developed.”  JA 12. 
 
As to the sovereign immunity asserted by both 
defendants, the District Court recognized that, to bring a tort 
claim against the Virgin Islands Government, its departments, 
or its employees in their official capacities, a plaintiff must 
comply with the terms of the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act, 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 33, §§ 3401–3417, as a predicate to the 
courts’ jurisdiction.  But it rejected defendants’ argument that 
the Family had failed to do so, either by filing an inadequate 
“notice of intention to file a claim” or by failing to file a 
“claim.”  “[S]ubstantial compliance with the statute is all that 
is required,” JA 11 (quoting Brunn v. Dowdye, 59 V.I. 899, 
910 (2013)), the Court observed, and the Family had 
“sufficiently complied,”5 JA 11.  
                                              
5 The District Court did dismiss claims for “negligent 
hiring and retention and negligent supervision/training 
contained in Counts III and IV” for failure to comply with the 
VITCA, JA 11, but those claims are not at issue in this 
appeal.  We note, for the sake of clarity, that the references to 
“Counts III and IV” appear to be references to each of the two 
counts listed sequentially in the complaint as “Count III,” the 
first of which was for negligent training and supervision and 
the second of which was for negligent hiring and retention.  
The actual Count IV of the complaint asserted vicarious 
liability against the Superior Court as Richardson’s employer, 
which, of course, merely reflects the “basis to extend the 
liability of [Richardson’s] underlying torts” reflected in the 
VITCA itself.  Bonelli v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, No. ST-
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Following the denial of their motions to dismiss, 
Appellants filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration, 
clarification, and a more definite statement, and asked the 
District Court to stay discovery until both that motion and the 
forthcoming appeal to this Court had been resolved.  But they 
soon withdrew the omnibus motion, and the District Court 
declined to issue a stay, ordering discovery to proceed “solely 
on the issue of . . . qualified immunity,” JA 14.  Appellants 
then filed this timely appeal.  Appellants also filed a motion 
to stay discovery pending appeal, which we denied.  
Discovery continued and, by the time of oral argument in this 
case, was nearly complete.  
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  Under the collateral order 
doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review a denial of quasi-
judicial or qualified immunity insofar as it turns on an issue 
of law.  Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 529 (1985); 
Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir. 2003).  The 
question whether that doctrine also vests us with jurisdiction 
over a denial of the Virgin Islands’ sovereign immunity has 
not previously been addressed by this Court, but for the 
reasons we will discuss in more detail below, we conclude 
that it does.  See infra Part III.C.1.   
                                                                                                     
13-CV-175, 2015 WL 1407259, at *5 (V.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 
19, 2015), aff’d, 67 V.I. 714 (2017); cf. Lomando v. United 
States, 667 F.3d 363, 373 n.8 (3d Cir. 2011) (“All [Federal 
Tort Claims Act] liability is respondeat superior liability[.]” 
(citation omitted)).   
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We review de novo a denial of quasi-judicial, 
qualified, or sovereign immunity.  Karns v. Shanahan, 879 
F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018); Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 
320, 324–25 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
III. Discussion 
 
Appellants contend that the District Court erred in 
denying Richardson quasi-judicial immunity and qualified 
immunity and in denying them both sovereign immunity.6  
We address each of these three immunity doctrines below.   
 
 
 
                                              
6 Richardson’s quasi-judicial and qualified immunity 
defenses apply to the extent he has been sued in his individual 
capacity, and his sovereign immunity defense applies to the 
extent he has been sued in his official capacity.  See Kentucky 
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166–67 (1985) (“[A]n official in a 
personal-capacity action may, depending on his position, be 
able to assert personal immunity defenses . . . .  In an official-
capacity action, these defenses are unavailable.  The only 
immunities that can be claimed in an official-capacity action 
are forms of sovereign immunity[.]” (citations omitted)); 
Davis v. Knud-Hansen Mem’l Hosp., 635 F.2d 179, 186 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (holding that the Virgin Islands’ statutory 
sovereign immunity “does not provide any immunity to 
Government officers or employees sued in their individual 
capacities”). 
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A. Quasi-Judicial Immunity 
 
We start with Richardson’s argument that he cannot be 
sued for using excessive force because, just as a judge enjoys 
absolute “judicial immunity” for an official act like issuing a 
PINS order, so too does Richardson enjoy “quasi-judicial” 
immunity for his official acts in enforcing that order.  We 
briefly review the history of this immunity doctrine before 
turning to its application to this case. 
 
1.  The Quasi-Judicial Immunity Doctrine 
 
Quasi-judicial immunity, as one might guess, evolved 
out of its well-known namesake, judicial immunity.  “Few 
doctrines were more solidly established at common law than 
the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts 
committed within their judicial jurisdiction[.]”  Pierson v. 
Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967).  That immunity secures a 
“general principle of the highest importance to the proper 
administration of justice”: ensuring that a “judicial officer, in 
exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act 
upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal 
consequences to himself,” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 
Wall.) 335, 347 (1871), and “without harassment or 
intimidation” in those “controversies sufficiently intense to 
erupt in litigation,” Butz v Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 
(1978).  Judicial immunity is thus essential to judges’ ability 
to exercise “independent and impartial . . . judgment.”  
Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993). 
 
The fair administration of justice depends not only on 
judges, however, and these same concerns apply to “certain 
others who perform functions closely associated with the 
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judicial process.”  Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 
(1985).  For that reason, so-called “quasi-judicial” immunity 
has been extended over time to protect a range of judicial 
actors, including (1) those who make discretionary judgments 
“functional[ly] comparab[le]” to judges, such as prosecutors 
and grand jurors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n.20 
(1976); (2) those who “perform a somewhat different function 
in the trial process but whose participation . . . is equally 
indispensable,” such as witnesses, Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 
325, 345–46 (1983); and (3) those who serve as “‘arms of the 
court,’ . . . fulfill[ing] a quasi-judicial role at the court’s 
request,” such as guardians ad litem or court-appointed 
doctors, Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2001).  
In this case, we focus on the last category.   
 
In determining whether a government actor was 
fulfill[ing] a quasi-judicial role at the court’s request, we take 
a “‘functional’ approach to immunity,” Forrester v. White, 
484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).  That is, “we examine the nature of 
the functions with which a particular official or class of 
officials has been lawfully entrusted, and we seek to evaluate 
the effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would 
likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.”  
Id.  Merely being “part of the judicial function,” even an 
“extremely important” part, will not automatically entitle one 
to quasi-judicial immunity.  Antoine, 508 U.S. at 435–36 
(refusing to extend such immunity to court reporters).  Even a 
judge will not enjoy immunity for “nonjudicial actions, i.e., 
actions not taken in [her] judicial capacity,” or for judicial 
actions “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”  
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (per curiam).  
Absolute immunity, we have been told time and again, is 
“strong medicine,” Forrester, 484 U.S. at 230 (citation 
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omitted), and the “presumption is that qualified rather than 
absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government 
officials in the exercise of their duties,” Burns v. Reed, 500 
U.S. 478, 486–87 (1991).  Accordingly, an “official seeking 
absolute immunity bears the burden of showing that such 
immunity is justified for the function in question.”  Id. at 486. 
   
2.  Application to This Case 
 
Appellants here contend that the relevant function that 
justifies affording Richardson absolute immunity is “the 
enforcement of judicial orders by a court’s marshal.”  
Appellants’ Br. 22.  Reading two of our precedents and one 
from the Tenth Circuit as standing for a categorical rule that 
“any public official acting pursuant to a court directive is 
immune from suit,” regardless of the specific action 
challenged in that suit, Appellants argue that Richardson 
enjoys immunity from the excessive force claim here because 
at the time he shot L.T. he was acting “at the direction of a 
judge.”  Appellants’ Br. 21.  And, according to Appellants, 
“[t]here simply cannot be one rule for a deputy who is able to 
accomplish th[at] directive without incident and a different 
rule for a deputy who meets with resistance that results in an 
injury or death.”  Appellants’ Br. 27.   
 
 The problem with this argument is that it ignores the 
distinction between claims based on the actions actually 
authorized by court order, which are barred by quasi-judicial 
immunity, and those based on the manner in which a court 
order is enforced, which are not.  As we explain below, that 
distinction dates to common law, has been consistently 
recognized by the Courts of Appeals, and is all but dictated 
by the “functional” approach to modern-day immunity.  It 
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also leads us to affirm the District Court’s denial of absolute 
immunity to Richardson.  
 
 We start with the common law, which informs our 
consideration of immunities available under § 1983.  Rehberg 
v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 362–63 (2012).  Historically, the 
“rule” was that a “ministerial officer [wa]s protected in the 
execution of process issued by a court,” meaning that, for 
example, a “sheriff” was “protect[ed] . . . in making [an] 
arrest.”  Tuttle v. Wilson, 24 Ill. 553, 561 (1860).  It was also 
clear, however, that when such a “quasi-judicial officer . . . 
act[ed] ministerially,” he could be “liable for carelessness or 
negligence like any other ministerial officer.”  Floyd R. 
Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and 
Officers § 643, at 429 (Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1890) 
(emphasis omitted) (hereinafter Mechem).  And because an 
arrestee was “entitled to be treated with ordinary humanity, 
and any unnecessary severity could not be justified by the 
writ,” Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or 
the Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract 395 
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1879), the common law provided 
that, “though the process for the arrest of the defendant is 
valid, yet the officer may render himself liable to the 
defendant for abuses of his process, as where the officer . . . 
uses excessive force,” Mechem § 771, at 509.  The 
authorization/manner distinction thus applied with particular 
force to officers tasked with making arrests.   
 
Contrary to Richardson’s contention, our own case law 
to date has adhered to this distinction.  In Lockhart v. 
Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1969), where the defendant 
had sued the court prothonotary for unlawfully refusing to file 
his appeal papers, we held that the prothonotary enjoyed 
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absolute immunity because his refusal was “at the direction of 
the court,” and “any public official acting pursuant to court 
directive is . . . immune from suit.”  Id. at 460.  Likewise, in 
Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1975), we granted 
immunity to an investigator for the public defender for 
“act[ing] under orders of the . . . court” to help extradite the 
plaintiff for prosecution, id. at 205, reasoning that the 
investigator’s “only function . . . [wa]s to assist in the defense 
of the accused” and he “ha[d] no power to deprive anyone of 
his or her rights,” id. at 207.  We observed that other cases 
had immunized “police officers engaged in ministerial 
functions under [a judge’s] direction,” id. at 206, but we 
noted that such immunity only extended to “officers acting 
properly under a warrant or other lawful process,” id. at 207 
n.6.  These cases thus distinguished between acts that were 
authorized by court order and acts that exceeded such 
authorization, but neither squarely addressed whether quasi-
judicial immunity extends to the manner in which an officer 
executes a court order.   
 
Other Courts of Appeals have confronted that 
question, however, and have consistently concluded that 
absolute immunity does not extend so far.  
 
Richardson purports to draw support from Valdez v. 
City and County of Denver, 878 F.2d 1285 (10th Cir. 1989), 
where the Tenth Circuit “h[e]ld that an official charged with 
the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoys 
absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit 
challenging conduct prescribed by that order.”  Id. at 1286.  
But the Valdez court went on to caution that, “of course, an 
official performing ministerial tasks with less than due care 
may be liable for damages.”  Id. at 1289 n.6.  And the 
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following year, the Tenth Circuit even more clearly rejected 
the argument that officers enjoy quasi-judicial immunity for 
excessive force claims, explaining that, “[w]hile the immunity 
granted in Valdez protects defendants from liability for the 
actual arrest, it does not empower them to execute the arrest 
with excessive force,” nor does it provide “absolute[] 
immun[ity] from liability for the manner in which [officers] 
carry out otherwise proper court orders.”  Martin v. Bd. of 
Cty. Comm’rs, 909 F.2d 402, 404–05 (10th Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam).  Instead, the court reasoned, because a judicial order 
“contains an implicit directive” that it be “carried out in a 
lawful manner,” officers who “exceed[] legal bounds in 
executing [that order] . . . have a fortiori violated the very . . . 
order under which they seek the shelter of absolute 
immunity.”  Id. at 405.   
 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits share in that view.7  In 
Richman v. Sheahan, 270 F.3d 430 (7th Cir. 2001), the court 
observed that the grounds for extending quasi-judicial 
immunity are “most compelling” when the suit challenges 
“conduct specifically directed by the judge, and not simply 
the manner in which the judge’s directive was carried out,” 
id. at 437.  The latter type of suit neither amounts to a 
“collateral attack on the judge’s order,” nor places the officer 
                                              
7 Cf. Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721–22 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (upholding dismissal of an excessive force claim 
against a courtroom officer where the judge explicitly ordered 
the officer to “put the cuffs on [the plaintiff]” on the grounds 
that the officer was “obeying specific judicial commands to 
restore order in the courtroom” and he “carr[ied] out a 
judicial command in the judge’s courtroom and presence”).   
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in the position of “being called upon to answer for 
wrongdoing directed by the judge” that he is “powerless to 
avoid.”  Id. at 436, 438.  Rather, the court explained, such a 
suit focuses solely on the officer’s “own conduct.”  Id. at 438.  
As a result, Richman held, quasi-judicial immunity should 
extend to officers “who do nothing more than implement” a 
judicial order—but no further.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit too has 
applied these principles to reject quasi-judicial immunity 
where the official “act[s] beyond the scope of [the judge]’s 
express and implied instructions,” and so is “exposed to 
liability (but still protected by qualified immunity) only 
because he allegedly went beyond what the judge ordered.”  
Brooks v. Clark Cty., 828 F.3d 910, 917–18 (9th Cir. 2016).8   
                                              
8 Although Appellants do not cite the case, both the 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits wrestled with the question 
whether Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (per curiam), 
suggested a different result.  We agree with them that it does 
not.  In Mireles, the Supreme Court held that a judge 
maintained judicial immunity for expressly ordering the 
plaintiff brought to his courtroom “forcibly and with 
excessive force.”  Id. at 10.  While noting that “[o]f course, a 
judge’s direction . . . to carry out a[n] . . . order with 
excessive force” is not a judicial act, the Court reasoned that 
the “relevant inquiry is the ‘nature’ and ‘function’ of the act, 
not the ‘act itself,’” for “if only the particular act in question 
were to be scrutinized, then any mistake of a judge in excess 
of his authority would become a ‘nonjudicial’ act, because an 
improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally 
performed by a judge.”  Id. at 12–13.  In other words, Mireles 
arose in the traditional judicial immunity context, as the 
plaintiff had “challenged the judge’s order directly . . . by 
suing the judge,” and, though the judge there had allegedly 
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Today, we join our Sister Circuits and make explicit 
what was implicit in our decisions in Lockhart and Waits: 
Quasi-judicial immunity extends only to the acts authorized 
by court order, i.e., to the execution of a court order, and not 
to the manner in which it is executed.  Here, the court order at 
issue is the PINS order, which merely required L.T. to follow 
his mother’s “reasonable rules,” and the Family does not 
claim that Richardson violated the law by performing acts 
authorized under that order; instead, they claim that 
Richardson exceeded the authorization of that order and used 
excessive force in the manner of its execution.  And, indeed, 
given the terms of the PINS order, the act of shooting L.T. 
was obviously not “at the direction of a judge.”9  Because an 
                                                                                                     
ordered the use of excessive force, the Court merely 
reaffirmed the basic principle that the “applicability of 
absolute immunity cannot turn on the correctness of the 
judge’s decision.”  Richman, 270 F.3d at 436.  The court 
order here, however, did not instruct Richardson to use 
excessive force; indeed, it did not instruct him to use any 
force at all.  Rather, as in Martin, Richman, and Brooks, the 
basis for this suit is that Richardson employed more force 
than he was authorized by any court order to use. 
9 Nor is it even clear that the shooting occurred while 
Richardson was acting “at the direction of a judge.”  
According to the complaint, the only reason Richardson went 
to the house that day was that Russell had “sought . . . 
assistance . . . with enforcing the court’s order,” JA 18—not 
because a judge had instructed him to do so.  In any event, 
even assuming Richardson was acting pursuant to court order, 
but see Tatis v. Allied Interstate, LLC, 882 F.3d 422, 426 (3d 
Cir. 2018) (at this stage we must construe all “reasonable 
 18 
officer’s “fidelity to the specific order[] of the judge marks 
the boundary for labeling [his] act ‘quasi-judicial,’” Richman, 
270 F.3d at 436, and a court order “carries an implicit caveat 
that the officer follow the Constitution” in executing it, 
Brooks, 828 F.3d at 919, where the claim is that an officer 
exceeded those bounds, quasi-judicial immunity does not 
stand in the way.  See id. at 917–19; Richman, 270 F.3d at 
437–39; Martin, 909 F.2d at 404–05; cf. Waits, 516 F.2d at 
207 n.6 (immunity extends only to “officers acting properly 
under . . . lawful process”).   
 
Finally, our holding is virtually compelled by the rule 
that any new extension of absolute immunity must be 
“justified . . . by the functions it protects and serves, not by 
the person to whom it attaches.”  Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227.  
This approach requires us first to “examine the nature of the 
functions with which a particular official . . . has been 
lawfully entrusted,” id. at 224, with the “relevant decisional 
material” being the “legal and structural components of the 
job function,” Dotzel, 438 F.3d at 325.  We then “evaluate the 
effect that exposure to particular forms of liability would 
likely have on the appropriate exercise of those functions.”  
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224.  Absent “overriding 
considerations of public policy,” absolute immunity will not 
apply.  Id.   
 
As relevant here, Virgin Islands law assigns Superior 
Court Marshals the functions of “execut[ing] all writs, 
                                                                                                     
inferences” from the pleaded facts “in a light most favorable 
to the non-movant”), he is not entitled to quasi-judicial 
immunity for the reasons we explain.   
 19 
processes and orders of the Superior Court,” and 
“perform[ing] such other duties incident to” the execution of 
those writs, processes, and orders.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, 
§ 351(b).  But while those functions, with which the Marshals 
are “lawfully entrusted,” are fully protected by quasi-judicial 
immunity, the use of excessive force in the performance of 
those functions is neither “at the direction of the judge,” 
Waits, 516 F.2d at 206, nor a “dut[y] incident to” the 
execution of the judge’s order, § 351(b).  We measure an 
officer’s acts against the yardstick of that officer’s functions, 
and—contrary to Appellants’ insistence that an officer is 
immune for all acts incident to the execution of a court order, 
regardless how “less-than-perfect” those actions may be,10 
Reply Br. 8—we extend quasi-judicial immunity only to acts 
consistent with the “appropriate exercise of those functions.”  
Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224 (emphasis added).  The Family’s 
claim, however, is premised on an alleged inappropriate 
exercise of those functions.  
  
For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s denial of quasi-judicial immunity.  
 
 
                                              
10 Appellants’ approach would turn immunity 
jurisprudence on its head, ignoring the “presumption . . . that 
qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect 
government officials in the exercise of their duties,” Burns, 
500 U.S. at 486–87, and immunizing law enforcement 
officers from suit for any number of civil rights violations 
committed while executing any court order, be it an arrest 
warrant, search warrant, or any other judicial directive. 
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B. Qualified Immunity 
 
We turn next to Richardson’s contention that, even if 
absolute immunity does not apply, the claim against him 
should have been dismissed on qualified immunity grounds 
because the complaint did not plead a violation of clearly 
established law. 
 
“In considering whether qualified immunity attaches, 
courts perform a two-pronged analysis to determine: 
(1) ‘whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged make out a 
violation of a constitutional right,’ and (2) ‘whether the right 
at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the 
defendant’s alleged misconduct.’”  Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 
F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2017) (alterations omitted) (quoting 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)).  Because 
“‘[c]learly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s 
conduct, the law was ‘sufficiently clear’ that every 
‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ 
is unlawful,” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 
589 (2018), the right must be “defined in terms of the 
‘particularized’ factual context of th[e] case,” Kedra, 876 
F.3d at 435 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 
640 (1987)).  Such “specificity . . . is especially important in 
the Fourth Amendment context.”  Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590.  
  
The allegations here meet that standard.  According to 
the complaint, Richardson was called to the Family’s house to 
“assist[]” in enforcing L.T.’s PINS order and to “br[ing] 
[him] before the judge.”  JA 18.  When Richardson arrived, 
L.T. allegedly was “relaxing,” “in his underwear,” and 
“unarmed.”  JA 19.  And, when L.T. “attempt[ed] to run past 
the marshals,” Richardson shot him.  JA 19.  These 
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allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to plead the violation 
of a clearly established constitutional right: the right of an 
unarmed individual to be free from the use of deadly force 
unless such force is “necessary to prevent [his] escape and the 
officer has probable cause to believe that [he] poses a 
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the 
officer or others.”  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985).   
 
 Garner, of course, “lay[s] out excessive-force 
principles at only a general level.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 
548, 552 (2017) (per curiam).  But “general statements of the 
law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear 
warning to officers.”  Id.  For this reason, while Garner 
usually “do[es] not by [itself] create clearly established law,” 
it may do so in an “obvious case,” id., for example, where the 
circumstances reflect “the absence of a serious threat of 
immediate harm to others.”  Davenport v. Borough of 
Homestead, 870 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2017); see also 
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (per curiam) 
(“[I]n an obvious case, [Garner’s] standard[] can ‘clearly 
establish’ the answer, even without a body of relevant case 
law.”).   
 
This is such a case.  According to the complaint, 
Richardson used deadly force against L.T. even though there 
was no indication L.T. was then engaged in any misconduct 
beyond disobeying his mother; immediately before the 
incident, L.T. was allegedly lounging in his bedroom; and 
L.T. allegedly exited his room wearing only underwear, 
making it implausible to a reasonable officer that he was 
hiding a weapon on his person.  Accepting these allegations 
as we must at this stage, there was no “serious threat of 
immediate harm to others,” Davenport, 870 F.3d at 281, and 
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“[t]he absence of any Garner preconditions to the use of 
deadly force” makes this an “obvious case where . . . Garner 
clearly establishes the law,” Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766, 776 
(6th Cir. 2005).  See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 527, 536 
(4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding, where an officer shot “an 
unarmed man wanted for [a] misdemeanor . . . when he 
started running away,” that “[n]othing removes this case from 
the straightforward context of Garner”).  
 
 Appellants marshal two arguments to the contrary.  
First, they contend that the definition of the right given by the 
Family in its brief here—the “right to be free from injury 
through the use of excessive force by law enforcement 
officers,” Appellees’ Br. 23—is too general to give officers 
fair notice.  But in defining the right at issue, we look not 
only to the parties’ litigation positions, but also to the 
allegations in the complaint.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 673 (2009) (“[W]hether a particular complaint 
sufficiently alleges a clearly established violation of law 
cannot be decided in isolation from the facts pleaded.”).  And, 
as discussed, the allegations here were sufficient in view of 
Garner.  
 
Second, Appellants take issue with the sufficiency of 
the pleading in the complaint, arguing that the District Court 
should have dismissed it under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) because it “d[id] not provide sufficient 
factual information for the framing of a proper qualified 
immunity defense.”  Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 
285, 302 (3d Cir. 2006); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Rule 8 
. . . demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”).  At the very least, they 
argue, the District Court, before allowing limited discovery 
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on that defense, should have considered “other procedural 
tool[s],” such as requiring the Family to file a more definite 
statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e).  
Appellants’ Br. 54. 
 
We are not persuaded.  True, where the pleading is as 
deficient as in Thomas—which featured a “textbook example 
of a pleading as to which a qualified defense cannot 
reasonably be framed,” 463 F.3d at 289—a district court has 
“several options,” such as ordering a more definite statement, 
id. at 301.  But the complaint here is not devoid of factual 
allegations.  To be sure, neither is it long on detail.  To 
survive a motion to dismiss, however, a complaint need only 
contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 
678.  The Family’s complaint meets that threshold, and the 
District Court thoughtfully and thoroughly analyzed the 
complaint to conclude this case was “too fact sensitive . . . to 
make [a qualified immunity] ruling . . . without discovery.”  
JA 85.  The District Court thus did not disregard Thomas but 
rather hewed to its guidance that “summary judgment remains 
a useful tool for precluding insubstantial claims from 
proceeding to trial.”  463 F.3d at 301 (citing Crawford-El v. 
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998)).  As we perceive no error 
in the denial of qualified immunity at this stage, we will 
affirm.   
 
C. Sovereign Immunity 
 
Finally, we turn to Appellants’ claim of sovereign 
immunity under the Revised Organic Act (“Act”), the federal 
law that “[w]e have described . . . as the [Territory’s] basic 
charter of government,” Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of Labor, 
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613 F.3d 87, 93 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010), and that “confer[s] upon 
[the Virgin Islands] attributes of autonomy similar to those of 
a sovereign government or state,” Richardson v. Knud 
Hansen Mem’l Hosp., 744 F.2d 1007, 1010 (3d Cir. 1984).  
One of those attributes is that “no tort action shall be brought 
against the government of the Virgin Islands or against any 
officer or employee thereof in his official capacity without the 
consent of the legislature.”  48 U.S.C. § 1541(b). 
 
 Before addressing the merits of Appellants’ sovereign 
immunity claim, however, we must assure ourselves that we 
have jurisdiction to do so.  See Gayle v. Warden Monmouth 
Cty. Corr. Inst., 838 F.3d 297, 303 (3d Cir. 2016).   
 
1. Jurisdiction 
 
Appellants contend that we have jurisdiction to review 
the District Court’s denial of sovereign immunity under the 
collateral order doctrine, which allows certain decisions that 
“do not terminate the litigation” to nonetheless count as “final 
decisions of the district courts” if they are (1) “conclusive,” 
(2) “resolve important questions completely separate from the 
merits,” and (3) “would render such important questions 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the 
underlying action,” Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, 
Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 865, 867 (1994) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291).   And they base that contention on Puerto Rico 
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 
U.S. 139 (1993).   
 
Metcalf & Eddy, however, does not squarely answer 
the question of jurisdiction for this case because the Supreme 
Court held there that the collateral order doctrine applies to 
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the denial of a State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity and we 
have not yet resolved whether the Eleventh Amendment 
applies to the Virgin Islands.  See United Steel Paper & 
Forestry Rubber Mfg. Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int’l 
Union AFL-CIO-CLC v. Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 842 F.3d 
201, 207 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016),11   As it turns out, however, we 
also need not resolve it today, because Appellants here have 
invoked sovereign immunity under the Revised Organic Act, 
and we conclude that statutory sovereign immunity, no less 
than Eleventh Amendment immunity, meets the criteria for 
the collateral order doctrine. 
 
                                              
11 The Eleventh Amendment provides, in relevant part, 
that federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear “any suit . . . 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.  “While 
the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State 
by its own citizens, th[e Supreme] Court has consistently held 
that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in 
federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of 
another State.”  Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662–63 
(1974).  Some, but not all, United States Territories have been 
held to lack Eleventh Amendment protections.  Compare, 
e.g., Norita v. Northern Mariana Islands, 331 F.3d 690, 693–
94 (9th Cir. 2003) (the Northern Mariana Islands is not 
protected), with Grajales v. P.R. Ports Auth., 831 F.3d 11, 15 
(1st Cir. 2016) (Puerto Rico is).  Because neither party asks 
us to resolve whether the Virgin Islands falls within the 
Amendment’s reach and we need not do so to conclude we 
have jurisdiction here, the question, as in United Steel Paper, 
is one “we do not decide today.”  842 F.3d at 207 n.2.  
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The first and third criteria are easily satisfied.  By 
providing that “no tort action shall be brought” against the 
Government without its consent, the Act makes clear that the 
Territory’s immunity is an “immunity from trial and the 
attendant burdens of litigation . . . , and not just a defense to 
liability on the merits.”  Fed. Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & 
Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1281 (3d Cir. 1993).  A denial of this 
immunity, like the denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
is a “conclusive determination[] that [the Virgin Islands] ha[s] 
no right not to be sued,” and the “value” of this immunity will 
be “for the most part lost as litigation proceeds past motion 
practice.”  Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 145.   
 
Our jurisdiction thus depends on the second criterion: 
whether a denial of the Virgin Islands’ statutory sovereign 
immunity is sufficiently “important” and “separate from the 
merits” of the underlying action to trigger the collateral order 
doctrine.  Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 867.  In Metcalf & 
Eddy, the Court concluded that a State’s invocation of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity met those requirements 
because it “involve[d] a claim to a fundamental constitutional 
protection.”  506 U.S. at 145.  But statutory immunity, the 
Court has made clear, is no less significant: “When a policy is 
embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision entitling a 
party to immunity from suit (a rare form of protection), there 
is little room for the judiciary to gainsay its ‘importance.’”  
Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 879 (emphasis added).  And the 
Court recently has characterized Metcalf & Eddy without 
regard to its constitutional dimension, describing the 
“particular value of a high order” there as “respecting a 
State’s dignitary interests.”  Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 
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352 (2006).  The Territory’s “dignitary interests” in its 
assertion of statutory immunity also command our respect.12   
 
Having satisfied ourselves of our jurisdiction under the 
collateral order doctrine, we turn to the merits of Appellants’ 
claim of sovereign immunity.   
 
2. Merits 
 
Pointing out that compliance with the requirements of 
the Virgin Islands Tort Claims Act (VITCA) is a prerequisite 
for its waiver of immunity from tort liability, Appellants 
argue that the Family failed to comply in two ways: first, by 
filing an insufficient notice of intention to file a claim, and, 
second, by failing to file a “claim.”  These arguments are 
perplexing, to say to the least, as they are flatly contradicted 
by the record. 
 
                                              
12 More than once we have found statute-based 
immunities to implicate sufficiently weighty interests to 
warrant application of the collateral order doctrine.  See Oss 
Nokalva, Inc. v. European Space Agency, 617 F.3d 756, 761 
(3d Cir. 2010) (doctrine applies to denial of immunity under 
the International Organizations Immunities Act); Fed. Ins. 
Co., 12 F.3d at 1281–82 (same for denial of immunity under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); cf. Aliota v. Graham, 
984 F.2d 1350, 1353–54 (3d Cir. 1993) (same for order 
resubstituting a federal employee for the United States under 
the Westfall Act, which “effectively denies [the] employee’s 
claim to absolute immunity”). 
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We begin with the notice, the purpose of which is to 
give the Government “enough information to enable [it] to 
make an investigation in order to determine if the claims 
should be settled without suit.”  Abdallah v. Callender, 1 F.3d 
141, 148 (3d Cir. 1993).  The VITCA provides that a notice 
of intention must be filed in the Office of the Governor of the 
Virgin Islands and served on the Attorney General within 
ninety days after the claim accrued.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 33, 
§ 3409(c).13  It “shall state the time when and the place where 
such claim arose” and “the nature of same,” and must also be 
“verified.”  Id. § 3410.  
 
Less than a month after the shooting, the Family 
served the following notice on the Governor and Attorney 
General:  
 
Re: Action for Personal 
Injury and Civil Rights 
Violations pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 against the 
Government of the 
Virgin Islands, Superior 
Court of the Virgin 
Islands and Marshal Carl 
Richardson 
 . . .  
                                              
13 While the statute states that a claimant need not file 
a notice of intention if she files the claim itself within the 
ninety-day period, it is undisputed that Russell did not file a 
claim within ninety days, and she was therefore required to 
file a notice of intention.   
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Notice of intent is hereby 
given to file a claim in accordance 
with 33 V.I.C. § 3410 against 
Government of the Virgin Islands, 
the Superior Court of the Virgin 
Islands and Superior Court 
Marshal Carl Richardson on 
behalf of Jamila Russell, 
individually and as next of kin to 
[L.T.], a minor, for personal 
injuries and civil rights violations.  
On July 11, 2013, [L.T.], while in 
his home was shot by a Superior 
Court Marshal who exercised 
unnecessary use of force, and 
caused serious personal injury to 
[L.T.], a minor.  The minor, [L.T.] 
had to be airlifted to a medical 
facility in San Juan, Puerto Rico 
for further treatment.  As a result 
of the incident, [L.T.] is not [sic] a 
quadriplegic who will require 
lifelong medical care and 
treatment as he is unable to 
breathe on his own.  The damages 
in this case exceed the statutory 
cap herein. 
 
JA 30.  In the bottom-left corner of the notice was a notary’s 
stamp and signature. 
 
Despite that accurate preview of the forthcoming 
complaint, Appellants decry “numerous defects,” Reply Br. 9, 
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chief among them that the notice allegedly contains “no facts 
alleged or notice provided as to any of th[e tort] claims,” 
Appellants’ Br. 33.  Citing Fleming v. Cruz, 62 V.I. 702, 
718–19 (2015), Appellants say these defects are “fatal” 
because the VITCA requires “strict[] compl[iance].”  
Appellants’ Br. 32.    
 
Neither assertion is accurate.  To start with, Appellants 
misstate the relevant standard.  As the District Court correctly 
recognized, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has made clear 
that “substantial compliance with [the VITCA] is all that is 
required.”  Brunn, 59 V.I. at 910.  The statute’s purpose, after 
all, is “not to hamper and harass the claimant” but merely to 
give the Government and relevant officers “prompt notice of 
the damages or injuries and the surrounding circumstances in 
order that the matter might be investigated and . . . liability 
determined.”  Id.  “If the notice is sufficiently definite to 
inform the officers . . . of the time and cause of claimant’s 
injuries or damages, it should be upheld.”  Id. (brackets 
omitted).  Fleming is not to the contrary, as that case held 
only that the VITCA’s filing deadlines are construed strictly, 
62 V.I. at 718, and it is beyond dispute that the notice here 
was timely filed.   
 
Moreover, even if strict compliance were required, the 
Family’s notice would pass muster as we perceive no 
requirement imposed by the plain text of § 3410 with which 
the Family did not comply.  But Appellants do—eleven of 
them, to be precise.  Yet none is even colorable.  Appellants 
state, for example, that the notice “does not provide a time or 
place where the alleged incident occurred,” “does not identify 
. . . Russell as filing a claim on behalf of . . . [L.T.],” is “not 
verified,” and lacks a “receipt . . . confirming [its] filing” with 
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the Governor.  Appellants’ Br. 40–42.  The Family’s notice, 
however, plainly states that L.T. was shot “[o]n July 11, 
2013” in his “home” (the “time” and “place” where the claim 
arose); it asserts that it is filed “on behalf of Jamila Russell, 
individually and as next of kin to [L.T.], a minor, for personal 
injuries and civil rights violations”; it is verified by a notary’s 
stamp and signature;14 and it is accompanied by certified mail 
receipts showing it was served on the Governor and Attorney 
General.     
 
Other alleged deficiencies are premised on 
“requirements” of Appellants’ own invention—such as an 
alleged failure to mention specific tort theories by name, 
although the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has held it is “not 
necessary” for the notice to “provide a precise legal theory 
upon which recovery is sought,” Brunn, 59 V.I. at 910, or an 
alleged error in Russell describing herself as her son’s “next 
                                              
14 With respect to verification, Appellants’ counsel 
declared for the first time at oral argument that the term, as 
used in the VITCA, means something other than notarization.  
But he offered no authority for that proposition; in fact, the 
only case Appellants cite having anything to do with 
verification cuts against them, as the court there deemed the 
claim unverified for “lack of a notarization.”  McBean v. 
Gov’t of Virgin Islands, 19 V.I. 383, 386 (Terr. Ct. 1983).  
Consistent with normal legal usage and in the absence of 
other authority, we consider the requirement that the notice be 
“verified” as satisfied by proof it was notarized.  See 
Verification, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (“A 
formal declaration made in the presence of an authorized 
officer, such as a notary public[.]”).  
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of kin” because he is not deceased, although Appellant offers 
no authority for the proposition that the use of the term is so 
limited.  Appellants also nitpick what are obviously 
typographical errors, such as recitation of Richardson’s first 
name as “Carl” instead of “Chris” or of L.T.’s status as “not a 
quadriplegic” instead of “now a quadriplegic.”  We will not 
deny jurisdiction on the basis of such quibbles when the 
Family’s notice was “sufficiently definite to inform the 
officers . . . of the time and cause of claimant’s injuries or 
damages.”  Brunn, 59 V.I. at 910.15   
                                              
15 By plucking from its context Brunn’s statement that 
a “failure to make any reference, let alone any meaningful 
reference, to the allegedly negligent actions of the 
Government” renders a notice insufficient, Appellants’ Br. 35 
(quoting 59 V.I. at 911), Appellants ignore just how closely 
Brunn tracks the history of this case.  The notice in Brunn 
alleged that a woman had been killed by a police officer and 
stated an intent to sue the police department for negligent 
selection, training, and supervision.  59 V.I. at 909.  But 
because as to those claims—as opposed to other kinds of 
potential claims against the department or the individual 
officer—the notice alleged only that the department had 
“employed” the officer at the time of the shooting, the court 
deemed it insufficient because it contained no “reference . . . 
to the allegedly negligent actions of the Government.”  Id. at 
911.  If that sounds familiar, it should: The District Court here 
likewise found the Family’s notice insufficient as to the 
claims for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision and 
dismissed them.  See supra note 5.  But here, unlike in Brunn, 
the Family also brought claims against the individual official, 
and the factual allegations it makes in support of those 
claims—and thus in support of the vicarious liability that 
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Appellants fare no better with their contention that the 
District Court erred in finding that the Family filed a timely 
claim.  The VITCA requires that a plaintiff, after filing her 
notice, file a “claim” within two years after the claim accrued, 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 33, § 3409(c), which must include, in 
addition to the information required by the notice, the “items 
of damage of injuries claimed to have been sustained and the 
total sum claimed,” id. § 3410.  So what is the alleged 
deficiency in the Family’s claim?  According to Appellants, 
the Family did not file one, because “a [c]omplaint is not the 
same thing as a ‘claim’ under the VITCA,” Reply Br. 15, and 
“[p]lenty of case law says that,” Oral Arg. at 38.14–.24, 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/17-
2255_Russellv. SuperiorCourtVI.mp3. 
 
This appears yet another misstatement to this Court.  
As our precedent makes clear, “where a complaint is timely 
filed under the [VITCA] with the proper parties having been 
served and contains all of the necessary substantive 
requirements . . . [,] the complaint suffices as a ‘claim.’”  
Albert v. Abramson’s Enters., Inc., 790 F.2d 380, 383 (3d Cir. 
1986), as amended (May 23, 1986).16  Appellants, however, 
direct us to Gonzalez v. Stevens, No. 82-191, 1983 WL 
                                                                                                     
would extend to the Virgin Island Superior Court under the 
VITCA, see Bonelli, 2015 WL 1407259, at *5; supra note 
5—render the notice sufficient.  
16 Appellants inaccurately cite Albert for the 
proposition that generally a notice of intent does not 
constitute a claim.   
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889445, at *2 & n.2 (D.V.I. Mar. 22, 1983), and Mercer v. 
Government of Virgin Islands, 18 V.I. 171, 174 n.1, 179–80 
(Terr. Ct. 1982)—cases that not only do not bind us and pre-
date Albert, but also cannot bear the weight Appellants place 
on them.  Gonzalez distinguished a claim from a complaint 
only to make clear that a claim “need not” have the 
“particularity required of a civil complaint,” 1983 WL 
889445, at *2, and Mercer actually rested its analysis on the 
assumption that a complaint could be “considered to be a 
‘claim,’” 18 V.I. at 179.   
 
In short, Albert controls, and the claim filed by the 
Family, like the notice of intent, complied with the VITCA.17  
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s decision denying 
Appellants sovereign immunity in all respects but one: The 
complaint included a claim for gross negligence, but, as the 
Family conceded at oral argument, the VITCA provides that 
its waiver “shall not apply if the injury . . . is caused by the 
gross negligence of an employee of the Government.”  V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 33, § 3408(b).  Although the District Court 
declined to entertain this argument because it was not raised 
by the Superior Court until its reply brief below, the “terms of 
the [Virgin Islands’ waiver of sovereign immunity] are 
jurisdictional” and therefore “may not be waived.”  
Richardson, 744 F.2d at 1010.  Thus, the gross negligence 
claim should have been dismissed.   
 
 
                                              
17 The Family’s complaint met all the requirements of 
Albert, and Appellants do not contend otherwise.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court, except as to gross negligence, and will 
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
